A new report shows that widely publicized cuts to the US Air Force Academy faculty and staff have actually been far worse than previously reported by USAFA, and without immediate help from readers like you, the situation will only get worse.
In a sharp rebuke of senior leadership, the latest Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) quantified the ongoing decline, since April, of both faculty morale and the number of personnel teaching, leading research, and managing the labs at the US Air Force Academy (USAFA). To revitalize academic excellence at USAFA, which by now is an uphill battle, a public call to action, and new organizational mechanisms to further ensure transparency, long-term academic continuity, and operational accountability, are long overdue.
In an Aug 18 2025 post, USAFA adapts to Civilian Workforce Reductions, USAFA claimed it had lost 25 civilian faculty members in the prior year, and backfilled with “19 additional military personnel with appropriate degrees and teaching skills”, for a net loss of just 25-19 = 6 faculty (1.2%). A subsequent post in early December, 2025 in Review, claimed that USAFA was down only 491-475 = 16 faculty members (3.3%) since early April.
Notwithstanding the numbers cited in these two posts, we now know from the official results of the most recent DEOCS (conducted last October and November) that the total number of employees who report to the Dean of Faculty (DF, which includes teaching faculty, research faculty and contractors, lab technicians, and support staff) actually reduced by 895-759=136 (over 15%) in the year prior to this survey. This scale of reduction in DF is consistent with the large number of now-empty faculty offices in Fairchild Hall, and calls into question how USAFA could have so misrepresented the scope of the ongoing force reduction of USAFA DF in the recent posts mentioned above.
To make matters worse, the departures of experienced teaching faculty continue unabated, and many more are scheduled, likely bringing the scale of the present decimation of DF at USAFA to well over 20% by June. Further, the incentivized departures thus far have been mostly voluntary, so those with options elsewhere have left first (that is, the best of the best in DF have been the first to leave). Further, as the cuts have not been targeted, some majors of high military relevance are taking huge hits, whereas other majors of reduced military relevance (what is the AFSC for a USAF Philosopher?) are still running at full force.
In the one example of which I happen to be most familiar, by virtue of my former (AY ‘24-’25) position as a distinguished visiting professor (DVP), the Mechanical Engineering Dept (DFME) had 24 faculty last year, it has 15 now, and it will have at most 10 by this time next year. At this staffing level, given DFME’s substantial load of core courses, DFME is unsustainable, and realistically must be folded into the Aeronautics Dept (DFAN) soon to redistribute its teaching load. This seemingly inevitable solution contradicts the assertion by USAFA, that there will be no major organizational changes to USAFA, or losses in its offerings, due to the ongoing Reduction in Force (RIF) of DF. We are left to wonder which other academic departments will also soon be unsustainable, and what will be done about it. These questions demand answers.
Regarding climate, 90% of those in DF who took the DEOCS survey reported “favorable immediate supervisor support”, though 72% said the organizational “climate is worse than last year”. Three times as many of those surveyed this year, as compared to last, listed morale as being a key concerning factor. Why? Most surveyed attributed the decline to “factors outside their department or DF,” which thus largely places blame at the level of USAFA senior leadership, above DF. A composite “morale” indicator, quantitatively constructed from DEOCS survey results (0%=bad, 100%=good), came in at 22% for DFME this year; it was over 50% last year, and DF-wide it dipped this year all the way to 40%. Poorly communicated rapid institutional change without clear objectives was commonly cited as a root cause. The greatest hits to morale within DF were felt by faculty, as opposed to non-teaching DF employees.
In the public comment section of the Dec. 8 USAFA Board of Visitors (BoV) meeting, I requested transparency. However, as of this writing (Jan. 20), the Dec. 8 BoV meeting minutes remain unpublished, and these requests and questions remain unaddressed. In light of the current devastating DEOCS results, the urgency of these requests must be upgraded. As a well-informed (after spending a the ‘24-’25 academic year teaching at USAFA) civilian taxpayer, I repeat these primary (now, urgent) requests:
- (a) Report accurately how many civilian, DVP, and active duty instructors there were/are/will be, in the previous two academic years, now, and projected for the next academic year, as tallied (separately) by each of the 20 individual academic department heads at USAFA, and reported (separately) for each department (for ease of verification), including:
– with how much teaching experience,
– with what degrees (PhD vs Masters) and relevant USAF/USSF experience, and
– at what military ranks.
(b) In light of the answers to 1(a), realistically report the anticipated effect that these losses will have on the available majors, minors, special focus areas, core classes, and anticipated class sizes in AY ‘26-‘27. Something’s gotta give.
(c) If majors, minors, focus areas, and/or core classes must be cut at USAFA (with an over 15% RIF of DF, they certainly will be), articulate how the difficult decisions on how USAFA will pivot and refocus its curriculum, in a military-relevant manner, will be openly debated and determined. Will a new “blue ribbon” panel of USAF experts be involved, as has been suggested? Or will decisions instead simply be made by its AFSOC-focused superintendent? By what mechanism will “buy-in” to these changes be sought with the broad range of USAFA stakeholders? - Acknowledge whether or not Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) were (and, continue to be) used to conceal the deliberation of how to handle the ongoing RIF of experienced faculty in DF. The use of NDAs in this setting is strictly disallowed by DoD policy, as such matters must be debated broadly. If NDAs have been / are being used in this setting, which is widely rumored to be the case, this conspicuous matter demands scrutiny by DoD and USAF Inspectors General (IGs).
- (a) Reinstate “education” in the USAFA mission statement.
(b) Commit to convert the (2-star) USAFA Vice-Superintendent position to that of a long-term civilian (SES) Provost, with a focus on long-term academic continuity, transparency, and accessibility by both faculty and cadets. This Provost position will be akin to the Provost position at the Air Force Institute of Technology, as well as the (long-term civilian) “deputy” positions in many USAF Acquisitions offices. The USAFA Provost will work in close collaboration with the Superintendent and Dean, and will report directly to the Secretary of the Air Force, thus providing a valuable “check and balance” on the actions of the Superintendent. - (a) Remove (entirely) the question “Does content address DEI, gender, official DoW positions or policy?” from the new USAFA Request for Presentation Approval form which was unveiled on Nov. 17. Focusing on DEI (for or against) is a distraction, and demanding subservient compliance to overtly political policy positions by civilian leadership, at the expense of critical military thinking and debate, is misguided. (b) Describe under what specific circumstances that such Requests will be denied, and articulate via new USAFA policy that, in the future when such Requests are denied, that the reason for such denials will be made clear and public.
In the time since the Dec. 8 BoV meeting, the several requests and stated concerns highlighted above have gone unanswered. We now demand that such answers be presented at the Feb. 5 BoV meeting. The rapidly declining DEOCS morale indicators briefly summarized above are highly disturbing, and must also be scrutinized closely at this meeting.
Call to action:
Public comment for the upcoming BoV meeting on Feb. 5 is explicitly allowed and welcomed, by Title 10 U.S. Code 9455, and is due by Jan. 30. I thus request that you, the reader, do two specific things:
A. please forward this article broadly via email and your social media channels, with a personal note, and
B. please send a short email to [email protected] (please click link!) urging action, before Jan. 30. This email could be as simple as the following (just copy/paste and modify to personalize your message):
to: [email protected]
subject: for Feb 5 BoV meeting: Request for transparency of ongoing RIF of DF
Dear USAFA BoV, HLC investigation board, SASC/HASC, Gen Bauernfeind, et al –
I am a …. <describe yourself here: concerned citizen, parent of a current/prospective USAFA cadet, 1989 USAFA grad, retired USAF Lt Col, former USAFA faculty/department head, etc>.
I am shocked to hear of the substantial decline of morale and the loss thus far of 136 (over 15%, and still climbing) of DF personnel at USAFA, as quantified in the recent DEOCS survey. Immediate action by the BoV and HLC is required to clarify the precise distribution of these staggering losses within DF, to stop this downward spiral of academics, and to clarify a robust and transparent process by which academics at USAFA will “pivot and refocus” appropriately.
Regards,
<your name>
The USAFA Board of Visitors (BoV), which is directly charged with overseeing matters such as those related to the morale, curriculum, instruction, and academic methods relating to the Academy, normally gets about 10 such emails for each of their meetings. Let’s organize together to make it well over 1000. It will take each of us less than a minute, but our coordinated action is required now (before Jan 30). Recent events in the US have emphasized one thing: for reason to prevail, our collective considered voices must not be silenced.
